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THE DEMISE OF OFFICER INVOLVEMENT IN SOLDIERS' SPORT DURING
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
by
Lawrence W.Fielding
William T. Weinberg
Brenda G. Pitts
Richard A. Fee
University of Louisville
During the American Civil War a few officers in the Army of
the Potomac became involved in organizing sport for
soldiers.1
They had ulterior motives. In each instance
officers intended to use sport to improve soldier morale,
assuage despondency and doubt, and to overcome homesickness.2
Officers chose sport because they believed that sport
entertainment had the capacity to create excitement,
excitement that drew men's minds off immediate problems and
left a generalized "good feeling"3 among the men. Once
officers had assigned a use value to sport, they began to
consider ways to maximize sport's usefulness as a morale
booster. To this end officers attempted to organize sport
to produce the greatest entertainment for the greatest
number.4 Their experiment, begun in the fall of 1861,
continued periodically during 1862, and reached major
proportions during the winter camp at Falmouth, Virginia in
1863. Between January 1, 1863 and April 18, 1863 officers
produced six major sport festivals.5 Each festival drew
between ten and twenty thousand soldiers. After Falmouth the
experiment ended abruptly.
Officers organized in specific ways for specific
reasons. Their plans and administrative efforts derived
from notions about the rank and file as spectators and as
participants. These notions were clearly wrong. Beneath the

obvious problems of organization and administration that were
created by officers incomplete understanding about the
soldier community's demand for sport involvement lay a deeper
misunderstanding. Officers assumed that the rank file would
willingly abdicate positions as organizers (producers),
allowing officers to formally subjugate leisure actions for
productive reasons. This assumption was not entirely wrong.
Initially, officers did formally subsume soldier's sport
making it an abstract and a concrete tool to meet morale and
entertainment needs. The problem was that a certain section
within the soldier society would not relinquish control over
their sport unless their personal demands for active
participation were met. When officers made organizational and
administrative mistakes that prevented maximum participation,
soldier organizers wrestled control away from the original
planners, restructuring organization to meet their own needs.
The transfer of control did not always occur smoothly;
sometimes officers fought back. At these times the
disruptions, the injuries, the loss of control alarmed
officers. In the end officers concluded that it was best to
let soldiers organize their own fun.
Typically, soldiers organized and administered their
own sport.6 Officers merely watched. Even massed sport, the
periodic snowball battles, rabbit chases, and horse races
that drew large crowds of participants and occasionally of
spectators as well, originated within the soldier
community.7 An informative general example of this process,
what caused it, and how it worked was the Christmas Day
footrace held at Falmouth in 1862 that made Riley Tanner a
celebrity.
Riley Tanner represents a particular class of
soldiers, men not opposed to officer involvement in the
organization of sport, but men who demanded the opportunity
to participate as often and as long as they desired. Tanner

was city bred; he grew up in Scranton, Pennsylvania. After
a minimum commitment to public school education, he
graduated into the work force relatively early in life.
When the war broke out in 1861, Tanner had been in the
labor force nearly a decade, six of those years as a
railroad mechanic; he had a steady job and family
responsibilities. Although the war for the union was
important, it was at first remote.
Tanner did not enlist
immediately because he had other pressing responsibilities.8
In August of 1862 when Robert E. Lee and the Confederate
Army threatened to invade the North, Tanner enlisted. Two
weeks later, a member of the "Railroad Guards," Company
"I," 132nd Pennsylvania, he marched to Antietam Creek.
The 132nd Pennsylvania became part of the veteran Gibralter
Brigade. The veterans greeted the new unit reservedly,
acceptance required the test of battle. At Antietam, along
the Sunken Road near the Roulette Farm House, Riley Tanner,
age 24, and the railroad workers fought their first
battle.9 Their test of courage, bravely begun, ended in
embarrassment when a Confederate cannon shell leveled a
long row of bee hives near where the soldiers waited to
fight. The men ran in all directions, chased by angry
bees, brigade and regimental officers powerless to stop the
rout.lO Three months later, at Fredericksburg, they redeemed
themselves, marching in closed ranks up the hill towards the
Stone Wall, where Confederates, lined four and five deep and
flanked by massed cannon, waited to open fire.11 Twelve
days later the survivors celebrated Christmas.
Christmas Day had its drawbacks but ended in
excitement. The men of the l32nd, experiencing their first
Christmas away from home and families, within sight of a
battlefield that could only be described as a devastating
Union loss, had little to celebrate. Dinner consisted of
boiled rice and molasses, hardtack, and stewed dried ap

les.l2 A whiskey ration, a gill per man, did little to
brighten enthusiasm. 13
In the afternoon the men organized
a footrace with the neighboring 4th New York. A group of
Pennsylvania soldiers had been roaming around in the morning
looking for something to do. They stumbled across a group
of soldiers in the 4th New York practicing their
sprinting. Unimpressed, the Pennsylvanians chanted, "He
is not much of a runner."14 Challenge followed immediately.
The Pennsylvanians hurried back to camp to spread the news
of the challenge. Large numbers of soldiers got involved
spreading news, joining and conducting sprint trials.l5
Riley Tanner emerged as champion. The commotion caused by
the challenge and the speed trials alerted men from other
units. Nearly the whole division gathered, lining both
sides of the track with a solid wall of men.l6 Tanner,
"running like a frightened deer," beat the 4th New York's
champion by a dozen feet. A furor followed. The
Pennsylvanians, hailing Tanner as hero, carried him
triumphantly through all the company streets, shouting and
bragging as Christmas ended in excitement.l7
There are elements in the above example that provide
insights into both the success and the failure of officer
involvement in organized sport. First, the footrace derived
from an impromptu challenge. A group of soldiers looking
for action found another group of soldiers at play. They
devised a means of getting in on the fun. Second, the
challenge led to a spree of hastily organized sprint trials
that allowed everyone who cared a chance to participate as
much as they wanted. Even if defeated a solder could run
again. He might not be declared champion, but he could
continue to race, searching for someone he could beat.
Beyond this, soldiers could and did participate as news
spreaders, sprint trial consultants and judges, braggers,
and opinion setters, and each felt some degree of

importance, a part of the event with a stake in the
outcome. Third, in lieu of a central organization
controlling the search for a champion, soldiers
administered several separate organized sprint trials.
These small pockets of organization permitted maximum
participation for both sprinters and administrators.
Finally, officer observers, although aware of the sprint
trial process, did not observe the actual administration
of the speed trials. Instead, they witnessed the final
race between Tanner and the 4th New York champion. They
did not distinguish between spectator and participant;
rather, they concluded that the soldiers enjoyed
themselves, that the excitement took men's minds off
immediate problems, and that sport improved morale whether
soldiers played or watched. Officers realized that the
quest for champion had been inefficiently administered.
This realization was perceptive. Indeed, it is possible
that Riley Tanner may not have been the fastest runner in
the l32nd Pennsylvania. His emergence as sprint trial
winner could merely have been a consequence of his desire
to continue racing even when defeated. Put another way,
Tanner won because he gradually wore down the opposition.
Officers aware of such possibilities concentrated on
streamlining the sprint trial process, assuming that
soldier organized trials were inefficient because soldiers
did not know how to organize effectively. Consequently,
when officers organized sport for soldiers, they focused
on administrative efficiency and chose sports that large
numbers could watch. Early efforts centered around
Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays and were regimental
affairs. The 1861 Christmas Day celebration organized by
Colonel Edward Cross for the 5th New Hampshire was typical.
Cross's original intent was merely to provide some
excitement for his soldiers on Christmas morning, leaving

them free to do as they pleased for the rest of the day.18
Although a stern disciplinarian, a man noted for his hot
temper when breaches of military conduct occurred, Cross
empathized with his men.l9 The 5th New Hampshire's ranks
were dominated by mechanics and small farmers, men with
little or no public education, men like Riley Tanner who
joined the work force relatively early in life. Most of
them were family men, and typically they left good jobs and
families behind when they enlisted. The average age in
the regiment was twenty-six. 20 They joined the war only
when Bull Run convinced them that victory demanded their
personal attention. Cross realized that for such men
holidays were difficult times breeding thoughts of home
and loved ones. To assuage homesickness and despondency,
he purchased a pig to be let loose at ten o'clock Christmas
morning.21 Regimental officers convinced Cross to expand the
format to include more activities. Cross added a five
hundred yard footrace with the best two of three heats to
decide the winner, a wrestling match, and a jumping
contest. For each athletic contest Cross awarded cash
prizes for first and second place finishers. The greased
pig chase continued as the final activity. Cross planned
the whole affair to be finished before noon.22
Nothing went as Cross planned. The footraces consumed
almost three hours. The wrestling match did not finish
until nearly three o'clock. The greased pig chase, the
intended climax of the day, had to be switched from last to
third event. The porker was captured much sooner than
anticipated. The jumping contest, the new last event, was
anticlimatic. Like the other athletic events, the jumping
contest took more time than Cross had planned; it ended
after dark.23
Colonel Cross's inability to administer sport

effectively within a given time frame derived from two
specific though interrelated causes. First, numbers
created the problems that frustrated Cross's attempt to
organize soldier's sport. There were too many people who
wanted to run, or to wrestle or to jump, or to chase the
greased pig. Conventional wisdom neither predicted such an
occurrence nor provided insights into how to deal with it.
The greased pig chase is a case in point. Cross planned to
conduct the chase inside a hollow square formed by the
soldiers of the regiment.24 This was not a bad idea. If
the soldiers maintained their positions, the pig would be
unable to break completely free. It would be forced to run
around inside the square and would eventually tire, making
it an easy target for the chasers. The problem with this
arrangement was that Cross did not designate which soldiers
would be allowed to do the chasing. Instead of a few
soldiers rushing after the pig, it appears that the hollow
square collapsed around the animal. Soldiers from all sides
made a mad dash for the prey. Forty year old private
Patrick Rowen reached the pig first.25 His hold on the
porker was broken by soldiers charging from different
directions. Despite collisions and grease, the soldier mob
caught the pig, knocking him off his feet and falling on
him, the sure weight of numbers preventing further
struggle.26 The administration of the greased pig chase
reflected the same fundamental organizational problems that
plagued the footrace, the wrestling match and the jumping
contest. There was too little planning for too many
soldiers.
The failure to anticipate the number of probable
participants resulted in a second problem. Cross lost
direct control over the sporting event and the actions of
soldier players. Once an event got started, there was no
good way of stopping it. The wrestling match is an

excellent example. Cross had no idea about the actual number
of soldiers desiring to wrestle. He apparently thought that
most soldiers would rather watch. Consequently, he gave no
thought or consideration to how he would handle wrestleoffs. Self-declared winners simply proceeded to wrestle
other self-declared winners until everyone had had enough
activity, and there were only two men left.27 Cross lost
control, in part, because he had not planned effectively for
the numbers he had to deal with. There was another reason.
When Cross's plans proved ineffective, the soldiers took
over, administering the fun in much the same way that
soldiers in the 132nd Pennsylvania organized the speed
trials that led to the emergence of Riley Tanner as champ.
Hence, poor planning and large numbers conspired, forcing an
administrative breakdown; in an attempt to save the fun
soldiers resorted to less centralized methods of
administration, forcing Cross to relinquish his jurisdiction
over sport.
There were obvious lessons to be gleaned from Cross's
attempt to organize and control sport for the soldier
community, but officers understood these lessons in
incomplete ways. For example, officers learned from
experiments like Cross's that better organization was
essential. The problem was the officers linked
organization to spectators not participants.28 Even when the
end result, improved morale, appeared to be successful,
officers misunderstood the cause. Soldiers at sport
appeared to be having a good time. Cross and other officers
linked this appearance to a general good feeling among the
men, concluding that sport was a viable alternative to
common morale problems such as despondency and doubt.29 This
conclusion by itself was not bad. However, Cross did not
comprehend that the good feelings derived from active
participation.30 Soldiers watching the activity wanted to

join; they wanted to feel good too. Officers aware of the
use value of sport as morale booster desired to maximize
sport's effects, but they concluded that these effects
accrued equally to spectators and participants. Instead of
planning to allow maximum participation for the greatest
number of soldiers, officers concentrated on ways of
producing excitement for large numbers of spectators. Even
elaborate planners like J.H. Hobart Ward and Thomas Francis
Meagher failed to understand that maximum participation
predicated intelligent organization.
The 1863 New Year's Day sport festival, planned by J.H.
Hobart Ward and his staff, paid close attention to spectator
enjoyment.31 The entertainment included a wide menu of events
designated to specific time blocks and organized for special
areas to insure maximum viewing pleasure. Soldiers cleared a
large, relatively flat area in front of division
headquarters on which they built a primitive stadium. In
front of the stadium they constructed a racetrack with
hurdle and flat jumps. Inside the race track they
established areas for mule races, footraces, feats of
strength and agility, boxing and wrestling matches,
burlesque cockfights and set up a wheel of fortune and a
greased pole climb. Space for each of these events was
necessarily restricted, but each designated area could be
easily viewed from the grandstands. 32 To make events
progress efficiently, Ward assigned officers to administer
each event. The 38th New York was given the task of
welcoming and seating guests and for providing overall crowd
control.33 Invitations were sent to the different units in
the division as well as to other units encamped in the
vicinity, "To attend the entertainment.34 Prize money was
raised among the officers of the division and a one o clock
starting time was set for the commencement of the
activities.35 Ward and his staff excelled at arrangements

for spectator pleasure and convenience.
Time and space, the two variables that Ward manipulated
in favor of anticipated large crowds of watchers, conspired
to cause problems when enthusiastic participants arrived on
the scene. The one o' clock starting time meant in effect
that there would be only four or at most five hours of
actual play time before darkness made watching difficult.
This restriction, requiring several events to be run at the
same time, was further complicated by limited space and the
belief that certain events, because of their spectator
appeal, ought to be run separately. Hence, Ward was
required to sequence events on the basis of time, space,
and anticipated spectator interest and to do so with a
tangible efficiency that kept everything moving. The first
event, the hurdle race, came off smoothly, but the races
that followed were interrupted by spectators pushing onto
the track in an attempt to join the fun.36 Exactly what fun
the soldiers were trying to join is unclear. They may have
desired to actually participate in the horse races. They may
have misunderstood the overall plan for the day. Fearing
that they would miss the opportunity to play, they pushed
onto the track to get to the wheel of fortune, the greased
pole climb, and to see what was going on in the infield.
In any event, their forced entrance onto the track and into
the infield quickly filled all available space, disrupted
organization, and threatened carefully planned sequences.37
Despite intricate planning, Ward's efforts to host the
New Year's Day sport festival failed. Even though the
activities that Ward and his staff planned did in fact run,
each had complications. The number of aspiring participants
and the lack of foresight about soldier demand for active
involvement caused the problems. The sport festival
attracted between ten and twenty thousand soldiers.38 The
centralized infield was not designed for anywhere near that

many participants. It would have been better to have spread
things out to allow greater play space. The events Ward
planned were not designed to accommodate enthusiastic
players but to entertain spectators. The wheel of fortune,
for example, permitted only one soldier to participate at a
time but allowed many to watch and to be amused by the
ludicrous failures of others.39 Organizers made no attempt
to limit or control the number of participants. Only for
the footraces did they announce any restrictions on who
could play; the footraces were closed to men in the
Pennsylvania Reserve.40 When massive numbers of soldiers
demanded access to the ranks of participation, planning
suffered and organization disintegrated. The race track
and the infield became a milling mass of men interested in
performing not watching. The officers of Ward's staff
assigned to run the events did in fact adjust. When the
time designated for their particular event was up, they
stopped and left the field.41 When this happened, the
soldier community took over and ran the event as they
pleased. This disrupted the administration of events that
were supposed to follow. Consequently, organization and
administration continued to deteriorate. Before the day was
over soldiers had succeeded, once again, in wresting the
control of sport away from the original planners.
In Cross's and Ward's attempts to organize sport for
soldiers a general trend emerges. Both officers intended to
use sport to improve soldier morale. When they organized
sport, they took control away from the soldier community, a
community used to planning and administering its own fun.
Both Cross and Ward took control because they wanted to
maximize sport's use value.42 Through proper organization
and efficient administration, they believed that they could
extend the entertainment power of sport to greater numbers
of soldiers. Initially, the soldier community acquiesced,

permitting the takeover of their leisure by officers.
However, when officer planning and administration failed
to accommodate solider interest in participation, the
soldier community first disrupted administrative efforts
and then gradually took over the control of sport. In
the above examples neither Cross or Ward attempted to
prevent or even contest the takeover. They simply
relinquished the field to the common soldier.43 Thomas
Francis Meagher and the staff officers of the Irish
Brigade did not give up control so easily.
The planning and organization that preceded
Meagher's St.Patrick's Day celebration of 1863
accentuated the errors that Cross and Ward made earlier.
Nearly every minute of the entire day was planned.44
Committees were assigned to organize every detail. The
day was to begin with a Mass at 8:00 a.m.for which the
brigade built a chapel. A steeplechase track, two and
one-half miles long, was constructed with hurdles and
ditched fences. The track crossed two natural rivers
which brigade engineers reconstructed, making them
uniformly thirty feet wide and between four and six feet
deep. Along the course judges' stands and a clerk of
the course stand were built. A large grandstand was
erected at the finish line. The horse races were to
begin at eleven o'clock, followed by a special luncheon
at one o'clock. In the afternoon sports for
noncommissioned officers and privates were planned.45
Meagher organized footraces, weight casting contests, a
soaped pig chase, hurdle races, a wheelbarrow race,
sack races, and an Irish dance contest. The evening was
to be devoted to theatrical entertainments including
recitations, songs, and toasts.46 Meagher and his
committees, aware of the time and space problems caused
by so many events, planned to control participation by

limiting the number of players in specific events.47 To
accomplish this end they expediently assigned certain
soldiers to act as participants,48 believing somehow
that other soldiers would understand that they were not
to participate and would therefore be content merely to
watch. Meagher and his staff apparently never
considered what the soldier community might do when they
saw the fun and were informed that they were not to be
included beyond the act of watching.
Although the day began smoothly, it ended
turbulently and abruptly. The first sport event, the
Grand Steeplechase, open only to officers in the Irish
Brigade, came off very well. The trouble began during
the second steeplechase, the "Race for All Comers."49 The
race was designed to allow officers in other units the
opportunity to compete in a steeplechase.50 A race for all
comers meant to the rank and file that anyone who wanted
to race would be given the opportunity to indulge their
desires. Consequently, some soldiers tried to join the
race.51 Fortunately for the organizers the race began
before the would-be participants could secure their
mounts.52 It was also fortunate that the organizers had
planned for the winner to be declared after only one
heat. At one o'clock Meagher announced that there would
be a short intermission before the afternoon sports
began. Thinking that everything was running smoothly,
Meagher and his staff adjourned to the luncheon feast
with their special guests.53
Attempting to adjourn so large a crowd before it
had the opportunity to do anything was not one of
Meagher's better ideas. When Meagher and his staff
vacated the racing field, the private soldier took
control. Horses of every shape and description entered the
field, ridden by all manner of horsemen.54 The race track

became a mass of men and horses, racing everywhere and in
every direction, without regard for life or limb. This
continued, despite injury and death, until Meagher and his
staff returned and attempted to regain control of the sport
events. By this time things had gone too far. The soldier
community was unwilling to submit again to officer control.
The soldier organized horse races continued despite the fact
that officers began to administer other events in the same
areas.55 Indeed, many soldiers viewed the planned for events
as mere sideshows to their own horse races.56 Just as the
last footrace began a fight broke out among the men. Joseph
Hooker, commander of the Army of the Potomac, whether
perturbed or frightened, decided that the only way to
regain control of the situation was to send the soldiers
back to their respective units.57 Hooker's orders brought
the athletic events to an abrupt halt.
Meagher's elaborate plans, like the plans of Ward and
Cross before him, were thwarted by rambunctious soldiers
bent on joining the fun. To his credit, Meagher realized
the need to limit participation. However, Meagher, his
staff, and his committees had not developed an effective
plan to limit participation. Instead of spending all his
time building facilities, Meagher would have been better off
devoting that time to conducting trial heats and elimination
contests to cut down the size of the field of active
participants. This process could have effectively included
soldiers as organizers and administrators in much the same
way that the 132nd Pennsylvania did when choosing a sprint
champion. This idea did not occur to Meagher. His actions
were expedient. He apparently did not consider what might
happen when soldiers discovered that they would not be
allowed to participate. The idea of telling twenty thousand
soldiers to wait while he and his staff had lunch informs
about Meagher's basic misconceptions regarding the soldier

community, its thirst for active participation and what it
was likely to do when officer organizers prevented fun.
Thomas Livermore, an officer in the 18th New
Hampshire, could have told Meagher what would happen. In
1861 Livermore had been a noncommissioned officer in the 5th
New Hampshire.58 He had been a part of the Christmas Day
celebration that Colonel Cross had planned.59 He knew how
the soldier community would react when official plans for
sport went awry. Livermore observed the Irish Brigade's
celebration on St. Patrick's Day, 1863. A devoted adherent
of horse racing, Livermore had been disappointed when he
couldn't enter "the race for all comers" because his horse,
borrowed from Adjutant Dodd, arrived late. Later, Livermore
decided that he had been fortunate: "I might have been
brought off the field with a broken collar bone, or worse,
had it not been that Dodd failed to reach the field in time
with his horse."60 After the first race had been completed,
foot soldiers took control of the track, sponsoring
additional races without the advantage of rules or common
sense.61 There were thousands on the field. Everyone who
cared to play mustered a horse and joined the fun. The
track, already muddy from the first race, became a slippery
quagmire. The racing continued, unrestrained by any power,
until two horsemen, charging in opposite directions,
collided. Both men were killed as were both horses.62 The
enlisted men, enthusiastic, eager to join the fun, took
control of the horse races when Meagher and his staff
relinquished the field. The lack of centralized control
made the horse race a free-for-all, a place unfit for man
or beast. The footraces that followed, Meagher's bid to
regain control, ended prematurely because the common
soldiers would not relinquish the control of sport a second
time without a fight.
Livermore's observations provide three important

insights into the problems officers experienced when they
tried to take control of soldier sport.63 First,
Livermore's description of the St. Patrick's Day
celebration provides insight into the process of the
soldier takeover. As Livermore watched the gradual
disintegration of officer control, other observers watched
with him. Not everyone pushed onto the field to
participate. Sport enthusiasts took control. Furthermore,
they took control gradually by creating small pockets of
organization. This was why there were so many horse races
in different directions at different distances. This was
why the track appeared to be a milling mass of humanity
and horseflesh. As the small pockets of organization
broadened, drawing larger and larger numbers into the role
of active participant, all semblance of official control
disappeared. Meagher may not have been able to regain
control simply because by the time he returned to the field
there were too many organizers already operating to permit
a return to a single centralized administration.
Second, Livermore provides important clues about who
the sport enthusiasts that took control of sport actually
were. Livermore's experience with the 5th New Hampshire
provided important insights. The soldier takeover of St.
Patrick's Day sport was more than merely a response to poor
planning and organization. When Cross's organization of
the Christmas Day celebration proved faulty, soldiers took
over because men, like Riley Tanner, were used to
organizing and administering their own fun. They
acquiesced to official involvement in sport administration
only to the extent that officers planned effectively. When
demands for participation were not met, soldiers took
control and administered sport for maximum play time and
enjoyment. Tanner and the soldiers in the 5th New
Hampshire shared similar backgrounds. Most of them entered

the work force relatively early in life by necessity. They
were men short on formal education and long on work
experience. They had steady jobs before the war, usually
as skilled workers. They enlisted late because they had
more pressing responsibilities at home. In general, they
were men who had experienced a modicum of success in life
as a result of their own drive and initiative. They were
used to taking work related orders from bosses or
employers. The notion that officers could or should take
control of soldiers' leisure activities, even if such a
development was in the soldiers' best interest, had not
occurred to them. When it happened, they waited to see if
their desire for fun was met. When it wasn't, they took
control.
Finally, Livermore provides insights into the
probable reasons officers declined to get involved in
organizing sport for soldiers after Falmouth. Despite the
disruptions, the loss of control, the injuries and the
deaths that attended the occurrence of the sport festivals,
officers still believed that sport could be used to
improve morale.64 However, the problems officers
experienced in organizing sport for their charges had
important consequences. In general, officers concluded
that the disadvantages outweighed the advantages.
Officers like Livermore believed that organizing
sport for soldiers was not necessary. The men who
disrupted sport, men who caused the problems, were
the active participants. They were the soldiers
who derived the greatest benefit from sport.They
were the participants who became so engrossed in
activity that they forgot immediate problems. This
becoming engrossed was also part of the problem.
When restrictions were placed in the way of their
fun, these enthusiastic participants responded by

organizing and administering sport on their own
irrespective of official plans. The spectators who
with Livermore continued to watch were not
actively involved and therefore derived less
benefit from sport festival. More importantly, the
soldiers who did get involved, the ones who
disrupted because they desired activity, were the
ones who would have organized sport for themselves
if officers had not bothered.65 Hence, officer
involvement in sport only created problems,66
problems that could easily be avoided by simply
letting the soldier community organize and
administer its own leisure, just as it had always
done.
FOOTNOTES

1.
Relatively few officers organized sport
for soldiers. Volunteer officers in the 2nd and
3rd Corps of the Union Army headed the of
principal organizers. There are no general
sources. See for specific examples: William
Child, A History of the 5th Regiment New
Hampshire Volunteers, in the American Civil War,
186l-1865Bristol, NH: R.W. Muss printer 1893),
p.41; William Penn Lloyd, History of the First
Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve
Cavalry(Philadelphia: King and Baird, Printers,
p.37; Alonzo H. Quint, The Record of the Second
Massachusetts Infantry,
1861-1865 (Boston: J.P. Walker, 1867), pp. 5152; Abner Hard, History o Eighth Cavalry
Regiment)Illinois Volunteers during the Great

Rebellion (Aurora, IL: N.P., 1868 , p.57;
Frederick T.Peet, Civil War Letters and Documents
(Newport, RI: privately printed, 1917), p.52;
George H. Allen Forty-Six Months with the 4th
Rhode Island Volunteers, in the War of
l865(Providence: J.A. & R.A.Reid, printers,
l887), p.41; Eugene A. N History of the 44th
Regiment, New York Volunteer Infanty)in the Civil
War 1861-1865 (Chicago: R.R.Donnelley and Sons
Company, 1911 , p. 155; Edwin M.Haynes, A
History of the 10 Regiment Vermont Volunteers
(Lewiston, ME: Published by the Tenth Vermont
Regimental Association, 1870), p. 27; Gil A.Hays,
Under the Red Patch: Story of the 63rd Regiment
Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-1864 (Pittsburg:
63rd Pennsylvania Volunteers Regimen Association,
1908), p.175; Edwin B. Houghton, The Campaigns of
the 17th Maine(Portland, ME: Short and Loring,
1866), pp.40-41. We have of course not attempted
to list every source containing instances of
officer involvement in the organization and
administration of sport for soldiers.

2. This point is derived from the analysis of
reasons contained in the specific sources listed
in footnote one. Other references to officer
specified reasons can be found in:
Oliver
Wilson Davis, Life of David B Birney Major
General United States Volunteers (Philadelphia:
King & Ba l867), pp.80-111; Edward K. Gould,
Major-General Hiram G.Berry
(Rockland ME:
Press of the Courier-Gazette, 1899), pp.89-93;
William Corby, Memoirs of Chaplain Life (Notre

Dame, In: Scholastic Press, 1894), p.29.
3. Corby, Memoirs, p. 9; David D.Co"y"gham, The
The Irish Brigade and Its Campaigns (Boston:
P.Dinahoe, 1869), p. 144; Michael Cavanagh
Memoirs of General Thomas Francis Meagher
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